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Abstract
Two orthogonal-state-based protocols of quantum key agreement (QKA) are proposed. The first protocol of QKA
proposed here is designed for two-party QKA, whereas the second protocol is designed for multi-party QKA. Security
of these orthogonal-state-based protocols arise from monogamy of entanglement. This is in contrast to the existing
protocols of QKA where security arises from the use of non-orthogonal state (non-commutativity principle). Further,
it is shown that all the quantum systems that are useful for implementation of quantum dialogue and most of the
protocols of secure direct quantum communication can be modified to implement protocols of QKA.
Keywords: Quantum key agreement, multi-party key agreement, quantum cryptography, orthogonal-state-based quan-
tum key agreement.
1 Introduction
Since Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed the first protocol of unconditionally secure quantum key distribution (QKD),
several aspects of secure quantum communication have been explored [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. One such idea is quantum key
agreement (QKA) [8, 9, 10, 11]. There are two notions of QKA. In the weaker notion of QKA that was followed in [12]
a key is generated by two or more parties through the negotiation which happens in public. Under this weaker notion
of QKA many of the existing protocols of QKD can be viewed as protocols of QKA. For example, well-known BB84 [1],
Ekert [2] and B92 [3] protocols of QKD qualify as protocols of QKA if we follow the weaker notion of QKA introduced
in [12]. However, we are interested in a stronger notion of QKA that was introduced in Ref. [8] and is subsequently
followed in all the recent works on QKA [9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. In this notion of QKA all the parties involved in
the key generation process contribute equally to construct the key. This is in contrast to QKD where a single party can
control the entire key. Before we introduce new protocols of QKA it is important to understand the differences between
key distribution (KD) and key agreement (KA) in further detail. In a KD protocol, a trusted authority (TA) chooses
a secret key that will be used in future for communication, and transmits (distributes) it to other parties who want to
communicate. In contrast, in a KA scheme (KAS): two or more parties establish a secret key on their own. Thus in
two-party scenario we may say that in protocols of KD, a key is created by Alice and the same is securely transmitted
to Bob, while in the protocols of KA, both Alice and Bob contribute information that is subsequently used to derive the
shared secret key. Further, in a good KAS each party contributes equally to the shared key and a dishonest party or a
group of dishonest parties cannot control or completely decide the final key. The last point shows why all the traditional
protocols of quantum cryptography e.g., BB84 [1], B92 [3], ping-pong (PP) [5], LM05 [6] etc. are not protocols of QKA
in their original forms.
Several protocols of classical key agreement are studied since the well known Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
protocol or the exponential key agreement protocol was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [20]. A large number of
the classical key agreement protocols are actually variant of the DH protocol as they are based on intractability of the DH
problem [[21] and references therein]. To be precise, security of these protocols depends on the intractability of discrete
logarithm (DL) problem which may be stated as follows: given a generator g of a cyclic group G and an element gx in G,
determine x. Quite similarly, the DH problem is stated as: given gx and gy, determine gxy [22]. Clearly if we can solve DL
problem in polynomial time then we will be able to solve DH problem in polynomial time. As there is no efficient classical
algorithm for DL problem, modified and improved DH protocols have been considered to be secure for long. Interestingly
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in 1997, Shor introduced polynomial-time quantum algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms [23]. These
two quantum algorithms clearly established that neither the RSA protocol nor the DH based KA protocols would remain
secure if a scalable quantum computer is built. This fact along with the already established unconditional security of
QKD enhanced the interest on QKD and QKA.
First protocol of QKA was introduced by Zhou et al. in 2004 [8] using quantum teleportation. Almost simultaneously
Hsueh and Chen [24] proposed another protocol of QKA. However, in 2009, Tsai and Hwang [13] showed that quantum
teleportation based Zhou et al. protocol was not a true protocol of QKA as a particular user can completely determine the
final (shared) key without being detected. Next year Tsai et al. [14] showed that even protocol of Hsueh and Chen does
not qualify as a protocol of QKA. In 2010, Chong and Hwang [9] developed a protocol of QKA using mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs). Apparently Chong Hwang (CH) protocol was the first successful protocol of QKA. They claimed that
their protocol is based on BB84. However, a deeper analysis would show that their protocol is closer to LM05 protocol [6].
Of course the security of both LM05 and BB84 protocols arises from the non-commutativity and nocloning principles. In
2011, Chong, Tsai and Hwang [15] proposed a modified version of Hsueh and Chen protocol that is free from the limitations
of the original protocol mentioned in Ref. [14]. All the successful and unsuccessful efforts of designing protocols of QKA
until recent past were limited to two party case. Recently an enhanced interest on multi-party QKA schemes has been
observed and several protocols have been reported [10, 16, 17, 18, 19]. A systematic review of all these existing works
leads us to the following observations.
1. The amount of works reported to date on QKA is much less compared to the amount of works reported on other
aspects of quantum cryptography, such as QKD, deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC), quantum
secure direct communication (QSDC) and quantum dialogue (QD). Thus we may conclude that QKA is not yet
studied rigorously and probably many more combinations of quantum states and protocols of QKA can be found.
Keeping this in mind we show that majority of the existing protocols of QSDC, DSQC and QD can be turned into
protocol of QKA by introducing a delayed measurement technique.
2. Security of all the protocols of two-party and multi-party QKA reported to date is based on conjugate coding,
i.e., the security is obtained using two or more MUBs and thus the protocols are essentially of BB84 type. This
lead to a question: Is it essential to use non-orthogonal states (2 or more MUBs) for designing of protocols of
QKA? The question is not yet answered, but the expected answer is “no” as QKA is related to QKD and a few
orthogonal-states-based protocols of QKD (e.g., Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) protocol [4] and N09 or counter-factual
protocol [25]) are known since a few years. Further, some of the present authors have recently shown that protocols
of QSDC and DSQC can be designed using orthogonal states [26, 27]. In addition several exciting experiments on
orthogonal-state-based QKD are reported in recent past [28, 29, 30, 31]. These recent experimental observations
and the recently proposed orthogonal-state-based protocols are very interesting as they are fundamentally different
from the traditional conjugate coding based protocols where two or more MUBs (set of non-orthogonal states) are
used to provide security. Keeping these in mind present paper aims to provide orthogonal-state-based protocols of
2-party and multi-party QKA.
Remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a protocol of QKA for 2-party scenario.
In Section 3, we provide a protocol of 3-party QKA and discuss the possibilities of extending it to n-party (n > 3) scenario.
Specifically, we have shown that the proposed 3-party protocol can be extended to a 5-party protocol of QKA that uses
4-qubit |Ω〉 state or 4-qubit cluster state. In Section 4, security and efficiency of the proposed protocols are discussed and
are compared with that of other existing protocols of QKA. In Section 5 we investigate the possibilities of transforming
the existing protocols of QSDC, DSQC and QD to protocols of QKA. Finally the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Protocol 1: A 2-party orthogonal-state-based protocol of QKA
Step 1: Alice prepares |ψ+〉⊗n where |ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
. She uses first qubits of each Bell state to form an ordered sequences
pA = {p
1
A, p
2
A, p
3
A, · · · , p
n
A}. Similarly she forms an ordered sequence qA = {q
1
A, q
2
A, q
3
A, · · · , q
n
A} with all the second
qubits. Here piA, q
i
A denote the first and second particles of i
th copy of the Bell state |ψ+〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. She also
prepares a random sequence KA = {K
1
A, K
2
A, K
3
A, · · · , K
n
A}, where K
i
A denotes the i
th bit of sequence KA and K
i
A
is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. KA may be considered as Alice’s key.
Step 2: Alice prepares a sequence of n2 Bell states ( |ψ
+〉⊗
n
2 ) as decoy qubits and concatenates the sequence with qA to
form an extended sequence q′A. She applies a permutation operator Π2n on q
′
A to create a new sequence Π2nq
′
A = q
′′
A
and sends that to Bob.
Step 3: After receiving the authentic acknowledgment of the receipt of the entire sequence q′′A from Bob, Alice announces
the coordinates of the qubits (Π2n) sent by her. Using the information Bob rearranges the qubits and performs Bell
measurements on the decoy qubits and computes the error rate. Ideally in absence of Eve all the decoy Bell states
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are to be found in |ψ+〉. If the error rate is found to be within the tolerable limit, they continue to the next step,
otherwise they discard the protocol and go back to Step 1.
Step 4: Bob drops the decoy qubits to obtain qA. Now he prepares a new random sequenceKB = {K
1
B, K
2
B, K
3
B, · · · , K
n
B},
where KiB denote the i
th bit of sequence KB, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and K
i
B is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. KB may be
considered as Bob’s key. He applies a unitary operation on each qubit of sequence qA to encode KB. The encoding
scheme is as follows: to encode KiB = 0 and K
i
B = 1 he applies I and X respectively on q
i
A. This forms a new
sequence qB. After encoding operation, Bob concatenates qB with a sequence of
n
2 Bell states ( |ψ
+〉⊗
n
2 ) that is pre-
pared as decoy qubits and subsequently applies the permutation operator Π2n to obtain an extended and randomized
sequence q′B which he sends to Alice.
Step 5: After receiving the authenticated acknowledgment of the receipt of the entire sequence q′B from Alice, Bob
announces the position of the decoy qubits (note that he does not disclose the actual order of the message qubits)
i.e., Πn ∈ Π2n. Alice checks the possibility of eavesdropping by following the same procedure as in Step 3. If the
error rate is found to be within the tolerable limit, they continue to the next step, otherwise they discard the protocol
and go back to Step 1.
Step 6: Alice publicly announces her key KA and Bob uses that and his own key (sequence) KB to form the shared key:
K = KA ⊕KB.
Step 7: Bob announces the actual order of the message qubits (Πn ∈ Π2n) and Alice uses that information to obtain qB .
Now she combines pA and qB and performs Bell measurements on p
i
Aq
i
B. This would reveal KB as she knows the
initial state and the encoding scheme used by Bob.
Step 8: Using KA and KB Alice prepares her copy of the shared key i.e., K = KA ⊕KB.
The protocol discussed above is an orthogonal-state-based 2-party protocol of QKA. However, several multi-party protocols
of QKA are introduced in recent past [10, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Of course none of these recently introduced multi-party QKA
protocols are based on orthogonal state. Keeping these in mind we aim to provide a completely orthogonal-state-based
protocol of 3-party QKA along the line of [10]. Further the possibility of extending the proposed orthogonal-state-based
three-party protocol into n-party case with n > 3 is also discussed in the following section.
3 Protocol 2: A multi-party protocol of QKA
In analogy to the previous protocol Alice, Bob and Charlie produce their secret keys:
KA = {K
1
A, K
2
A, K
3
A, · · · , K
n
A},
KB = {K
1
B, K
2
B, K
3
B, · · · , K
n
B},
KC = {K
1
C, K
2
C , K
3
C , · · · , K
n
C},
where KiA, K
i
B, K
i
C denote i
th bit of key of Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively1 and i = 1, 2, · · · , n. We describe a
protocol of multi-party QKA in the following steps.
Step 1: Alice, Bob and Charlie separately prepare |ψ+〉⊗nA , |ψ
+〉⊗nB and |ψ
+〉⊗nC , respectively. As in Step 1 of the previous
protocol Alice prepares two ordered sequences pA = {p
1
A, p
2
A, p
3
A, · · · , p
n
A} and qA = {q
1
A, q
2
A, q
3
A, · · · , q
n
A} composed
of all the first and the second qubits of the Bell states that she has prepared. Similarly, Bob and Charlie prepare
pB = {p
1
B, p
2
B, p
3
B, · · · , p
n
B}, qB = {q
1
B, q
2
B, q
3
B , · · · , q
n
B} and pC = {p
1
C , p
2
C , p
3
C , · · · , p
n
C}, qC = {q
1
C , q
2
C , q
3
C , · · · , q
n
C}
from |ψ+〉⊗nB and |ψ
+〉⊗nC , respectively.
Step 2: Each of Alice, Bob and Charlie separately prepares sequence of n2 Bell states ( |ψ
+〉⊗
n
2 )j with j ∈ {A, B, C}
as decoy qubits and concatenates the sequence with qj to form extended sequences q
′
j . Subsequently user j applies
permutation operator (Π2n)j on q
′
j to create a new sequence (Πn)jq
′
j = q
′′
j and sends that to user j + 1.
Here we follow a notation in which j ∈ {A, B, C} and A, B,C follows a modulo 3 algebra that gives us the relations:
A+ 3 = B + 2 = C + 1 = A, A = C + 1, B = A+ 1, C = B + 1 and so on.
Step 3: After receiving the authentic acknowledgment of receipt from the receiver (user j+1) corresponding sender (user
j) announces the coordinates of the qubits (Π2n)j sent by him/her. Each receiver computes error rate as in Step 3
of the previous protocol. If the computed error rates are found to be within the tolerable limit, they continue to the
next step, otherwise they discard the protocol and go back to Step 1.
1Here subscripts A, B, C denote Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively.
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Step 4: After discarding the decoy qubits each user j encodes his/her secret bits by applying the unitary operation on
each qubit of the sequence received by him (i.e., on qj−1) in accordance with his/her key Kj. The encoding scheme
is as follows: If Kij = 0 (1) then user j applies I (X) on q
i
j−1. As a result of encoding operations, user j obtains a
new sequence rj . After the encoding operation user j concatenates rj with a sequence of
n
2 Bell states ( |ψ
+〉⊗
n
2 )j
that is prepared as decoy qubits and subsequently applies the permutation operator (Π2n)j to obtain an extended
and randomized sequence r′j which he/she sends to the user j + 1.
Step 5: After receiving the authentic acknowledgment of the receipt of the sequence r′j from the receiver j+1, the sender
j announces the coordinates of the decoy qubits i.e., (Πn)j ∈ (Π2n)j . User j +1 uses the information for computing
the error rate as before and if it is below the threshold value then they go on to the next step, otherwise they
discard the communication. In absence of eavesdropping user j announces the coordinates of the message qubits
i.e., (Πn)j ∈ (Π2n)j .
Step 6: Same as Step 4 with only difference that if Kij = 0 and K
i
j = 1 then user j applies I and Z respectively on r
i
j−1.
As a result of encoding operations user j obtains a new sequence sj and after insertion of decoy qubits and applying
permutation operator he/she obtains a randomized sequence s′j which he/she sends to the user j + 1.
Step 7: Same as Step 5.
Step 8: After discarding the decoy qubits each user rearranges the sequence received by him/her. Now each user j has
two ordered sequences pj and sj−1. Each of the users j performs Bell measurements on pijs
i
j−1. According to the
output of the Bell measurement and Table 1 each user j can obtain the secret keys of the other two parties. Hence
the shared secret key K = KA ⊕KB ⊕KC can be generated.
Initial state
prepared by
user j
First operator
applied by user
j + 1
Second operator
applied by user
j + 2
Final State
|ψ+〉 I ⊗ I I ⊗ I |ψ+〉
I ⊗ I I ⊗ Z |ψ−〉
I ⊗X I ⊗ I |φ+〉
I ⊗X I ⊗ Z |φ−〉
Table 1: Transformation of |ψ+〉 based on two operations. Here + refers to modulo 3 operations. j ∈ {A, B, C} where
A, B, C stands for Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively. Thus A+ 2 = C = A− 1 and so on. Further, to denote the Bell
states, we have used the following conventions: |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
Here we note that {I, X, iY, Z} is a modified Pauli group2 under multiplication and {I, X}, {I, Z} are its disjoint
subgroups. Here disjoint subgroups refer to two subgroups gi and gj of a group G that satisfy gi ∩ gj = {I}, where I is
the identity element. Thus except identity element gi and gj do not contain any other common element. Now we assume
that G is a group of order M under multiplication and elements of G are x-qubit unitary operators. Further, we assume
that there exist n mutually disjoint subgroups gi with i = 1, · · · , n of the group G such that gi’s are of equal size (say
each of the gi’s has 2
y elements) and Π⊗mi gi = g1 ⊗ g2 ⊗ g3 ⊗ · · · ⊗ gm =
{
U1, U2, · · · , U(2y)m
}
where (2y)m ≤M ; Ui ∈ G
and Ui 6= Ul ∀ i, l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , (2
y)
m
} . Now if we have I⊗(N−x)Ui|φ0〉 = |φi〉 and 〈φi|φl〉 = δi,l where |φi〉 is an N -qubit
quantum state with N > x, then we can have an (m + 1)-party version of Protocol 2 of QKA. In this (m + 1)-party
protocol of QKA all the (m+1) parties create quantum state |φ0〉 in the beginning. Each user keeps the first N −x qubits
of |φ0〉 with himself/herself and sends the remaining qubits to the user j+1 after following the strategy for eavesdropping
checking. Subsequently, user j encodes his/her y-bit secret key (N > x ≥ y) by applying unitary operators from g1 on
the x qubits that he/she has received from the user j − 1 in the previous step and sends the key encoded state to user
j+1. After m rounds of such encoding (in kth round of encoding operation all the users encodes their keys using elements
of gk) and communication operations user j measures the N qubits of his/her possession using {|φi〉} basis. From the
input state (|φ0〉) and output state (say, |φfinal〉 = |φk〉) he/she would know the unitary operator Uk that has converted
the initial state into the final state. Now the condition Π⊗mi gi =
{
U1, U2, · · · , U(2y)m
}
where Ui ∈ G and Ui 6= Ul ensures
that every sequence of encoding operations will lead to different Uk and this is how user j can know the key encoded by
the other users and he/she can use that to create the shared key K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Km, where the secret key of the user j
is Kj.
2In the stabilizer formalism of quantum error correction Pauli group is frequently used (see Section 10.5.1 of [32]). It is usually defined as
G1 = {±I,±iI,±σx,±iσx,±σy ,±iσy ,±σz ,±iσz} , where σi is a Pauli matrix. The inclusion of ±1 and ±i ensures that G1 is closed under
standard matrix multiplication, but the effect of σi, −σi, iσi and −iσi on a quantum state is the same. So in [33] we redefined the multiplication
operation for two elements of the group in such a way that global phase is ignored from the product of matrices. This is consistent with the
quantum mechanics and it gives us a modified Pauli group G1 = {I, σx, iσy , σz} = {I, X, iY, Z}.
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In Protocol 2 we have used modified Pauli group G = G1 = {I, X, iY, Z}. It has three disjoint subgroups: g1 =
{I,X}, g2 = {I, Z}, g3 = {I, iY } which satisfy g1 ⊗ g2 = g2 ⊗ g3 = g3 ⊗ g1 = G1. Further, |φ0〉 = |ψ
+〉 and as G1 is the
set of elements used for dense coding using Bell states so it naturally implies Ui|φ0〉 = |φi〉∀Ui ∈ G : 〈φi|φl〉 = δi,l. Thus
Protocol 2 is a special case of a more general scenario described here. Many more examples can be obtained from the
properties of Pauli groups discussed in Ref. [33]. Just to provide specific examples we may note that for the modified
Pauli group
G2 = G1 ⊗G1 = {I, X, iY, Z} ⊗ {I, X, iY, Z}
= {I ⊗ I, I ⊗X, I ⊗ iY, I ⊗ Z, X ⊗ I, X ⊗X,
X ⊗ iY, X ⊗ Z, iY ⊗ I, iY ⊗X, iY ⊗ iY,
iY ⊗ Z,Z ⊗ I, Z ⊗X, Z ⊗ iY, Z ⊗ Z}
(1)
we have following disjoint subgroups of order 2: g1 = {I ⊗ I, I ⊗X} , g2 = {I ⊗ I, X ⊗ I} , g3 = {I ⊗ I, I ⊗ Z} ,
g4 = {I ⊗ I, Z ⊗ I} , g5 = {I ⊗ I, I ⊗ iY } and g6 = {I ⊗ I, iY ⊗ I} . Further, these disjoint subgroups satisfy
g1 ⊗ g2 ⊗ g3 ⊗ g4 = g1 ⊗ g2 ⊗ g5 ⊗ g6 = g3 ⊗ g4 ⊗ g5 ⊗ g6 = G2 (2)
and the elements of G2 can be used for dense coding using 4-qubit maximally entangled |Ω〉 state and cluster (|C〉) state
if the elements of G2 operate on 1
st and 3rd qubits of these states. Here
|Ω〉 = 12 (|0000〉+ |0110〉+ |1001〉 − |1111〉),
|C〉 = 12 (|0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉 − |1111〉).
The table of dense coding for these states using elements of G2 is explicitly shown in our earlier work (see Table 1 of Ref.
[33]). As the elements of G2 can be used for dense coding using |Ω〉 and |C〉 states, output states obtained on application
of the elements of G2 on |Ω〉 or |C〉 are mutually orthogonal. This clearly implies that we can construct a 5-party protocol
of QKA using |Ω〉 or |C〉 state where each user prepares a large number copies of one of these two states and keeps 2nd
and 4th qubit with himself/herself and sends the remaining qubits to next user and later encodes his/her secret key using
g′is. In a 5-party protocol, encoding operation should take place in 4 rounds and the users would use either g1, g2, g3, g4 or
g1, g2, g5, g6 or g3, g4, g5, g6. We can generate many more examples of multi-party protocols of QKA using similar strategy
and properties of modified Pauli group.
4 Security and efficiency analysis
Protocol 2 is designed along the line of existing protocol of Yin, Ma and Liu [10] with a modified strategy of eavesdropping
checking that converts the non-orthogonal-state-based protocol of Yin, Ma and Liu into an orthogonal-state-based protocol.
Unconditional security of the eavesdropping checking using this technique is already shown in our earlier works [26, 27]
where we have also established that security of this orthogonal-state-based technique of eavesdropping checking originates
from the monogamy of entanglement [27]. Thus the protocol is secure against external attacks (eavesdropping). Remaining
part of the protocol is technically equivalent to Yin Ma Liu (YML) protocol and consequently the security of YML protocol
against the internal attacks (i.e., the attempts of malicious Alice, Bob and Charlie to completely control the key either
individually or by mutual cooperation of any two users) is applicable here, too. Thus Protocol 2 is a secure protocol of
QKA and it does not need any separate elaborate discussion. Keeping this in mind in the remaining part of the present
section we have explicitly analyzed the security of Protocol 1.
4.1 Security against eavesdropping
Our Protocol 1 and also the protocol of Chong and Hwang [9] may be viewed as protocols of secure direct communication
of KB from Bob to Alice added with a classical communication of KA from Alice to Bob. Specifically, instead of sending
a meaningful message Alice and Bob send random keys to each other. While Bob sends his key KB by using a DSQC
or QSDC scheme, Alice announces her key KA publicly. Security proofs of the existing protocols of DSQC and QSDC
ensures that the key communicated by Bob (i.e., KB) using DSQC or QSDC scheme is unconditionally secure. Thus
Eve has no information about KB. On the other hand the key communicated by Alice (i.e., KA) is a public knowledge.
However, it does not affect the secrecy of the shared key as the final shared key to be produced and used is KA ⊕KB,
knowledge of KA alone does not provide any information about KA ⊕KB. Thus the shared key produced in this manner
is secure from external attacks of Eve. However, there may exist insider attacks in which Alice or Bob tries to completely
control the shared key. Security of Protocol 1 against such attacks is described below.
4.1.1 Security against dishonest Alice
To communicate KB if Alica and Bob use a standard protocol of DSQC or QSDC (say they use PP protocol), then it
would be possible for Alice to know Bob’s secret key before she announces KA. In that case she will be able to completely
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control the shared key by manipulating KA as per her wish. To circumvent this attack we have modified the protocol
in such a way that Bob does not announce the coordinates of the message qubits sent by him till he receives KA. This
strategy introduces a delay in measurement of Alice and this delayed measurement strategy ensures that Alice cannot
control the key by knowing KB prior to her announcement of KA.
4.1.2 Security against dishonest Bob
Alice announces her key only after receiving the message qubits (without their actual order) from Bob. This ensures that
Bob cannot control the key by knowing Alice’s key. Only thing that Bob can do after knowing KA is to change/modify
the coordinates of q′B, but any modification in that would lead to entanglement swapping in our case and that would lead
to probabilistic outcomes without any control of Bob. Further, Bob will be completely unaware of KB to be generated
by Alice in that case and as a consequence any such effort of Bob would lead to different keys at ends of Alice and Bob.
Thus the protocol ensures that Bob cannot control the key. Here we may note that similar strategy was used in Chong
and Hwang [9] protocol. In their protocol modified QSDC scheme that was used for Bob to Alice communication was
equivalent to LM05 [6] protocol. In contrast here we have used a modified orthogonal version of PP-type protocol which
may be referred to as PPGV protocol [27].
5 Turning existing protocols of quantum communication to protocols of
QKA
In the previous sections we have seen that there exist a strong link between protocols of DSQC/QSDC and those of QKA.
For example, PP [5] and LM05 [6] protocols of QSDC have already been employed to design protocols of QKA (Protocol 1
presented here and CH protocol [9]). This observation leads to an important question: Is it possible to convert all protocols
of secure direct quantum communication into protocols of QKA? In what follows we aim to answer this question. We also
aim to study the possibilities of transforming other protocols of quantum communication to protocols of QKA.
5.1 Turning a protocol of QSDC/DSQC to a protocol of QKA
Recently we have shown that maximally efficient protocols for secure direct quantum communications can be constructed
using any arbitrary orthogonal basis [26]. However, all of them will not lead to protocol of QKA. To be precise, eaves-
dropping can be avoided in all protocols of DSQC and QSDC and by randomizing the sequence of key encoded bits sent
by Bob (i.e., by delaying the measurement to be performed by Alice) we can circumvent the attacks of dishonest Alice,
but it is not sufficient to build a protocol of QKA. We also need to avoid the attacks of dishonest Bob. To do so we
need to restrict the information available to Bob. Specifically, Bob must not have complete information of the basis that
is used to prepare the qubits on in which he has encoded his key. In our Protocol 1 and in all orthogonal-state-based
two-way DSQC/QSDC protocols this can be achieved if Alice keeps some of the qubits of each entangled state with her as
that would restrict Bob from changing KB after receiving KA. The same can be achieved in a non-orthogonal-state-based
protocol by using more than one MUBs. If Alice prepares the state randomly using one of the basis sets and don’t disclose
the basis set used by her till Bob discloses the sequence then Bob will not have complete access of the basis set used for
preparation of the message qubits. As a consequence he will not be able to control the key. This is shown in a particular
case in Ref. [9].
The above discussion shows that the DSQC/QSDC protocol to be used to implement a QKA protocol cannot be
one-way as in that case Bob will have complete access to the basis in which the quantum state used for encoding of his key
is prepared (since in a one-way protocol Bob himself will prepare the quantum state). Thus none of the one-way protocol
of DSQC or QSDC would lead to QKA. However, most of the two-way protocols of secure quantum communication would
lead to QKA. As example, we may note both Deng Long Liu (DLL) protocol [34] and Cai Li (CL) protocol [35] can be
viewed as variant of PP protocol [36], but DLL being a one-way protocol would not give us a QKA protocol, but two-way
CL protocol would lead to a QKA protocol.
5.2 Turning a protocol of QD to a protocol of QKA
A very interesting two-way quantum communication scheme is QD [[33] and references therein]. Since in the above we
have already seen that two-way secure direct communication is useful for QKA and since a large number of alternatives for
implementing quantum dialogue are recently proposed by us (see Table 4 of Ref. [33]), it would be worthy to investigate
the relation between QKA and QD. In a Ba An type QD protocol [37], Alice keeps part of an entangled state (|φ〉i)
with herself and encodes her secret on the remaining qubits by applying unitary operation UA and subsequently sends
the message encoded qubits to Bob who applies UB on them and returns the qubits to Alice with appropriate strategy
of eavesdropping checking. Now Alice measures the final state (|φ〉f ) and announces the outcome. As the states and
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operators are chosen in such a way that |φ〉i and |φ〉f are mutually orthogonal, from the announcement of Alice we know
UAUB. As Alice (Bob) knows UA (UB) she (he) can easily obtain UB (UA) using UAUB obtained from the announcement
of Alice. For a detailed discussion see Ref. [33] where it is explicitly shown that if we have a set of mutually orthogonal
n-qubit states {|φ0〉, |φ1〉, · · · , |φi〉, · · · , |φ2n−1〉} and a set of m-qubit unitary operators {U0, U1, U2, · · · , U2n−1} such that
Ui|φ0〉 = |φi〉 and {U0, U1, U2, · · · , U2n−1} forms a group under multiplication then it would be sufficient to construct a
quantum dialogue protocol of Ba An type. Now assume that n > m and Alice encodes nothing (i.e., she always choose
UA = Im ) and keeps (n − m)-qubits with herself and sends the remaining m-qubits to Bob who encodes his key by
applying an m-qubit unitary operation UB and sends that back to Alice, but only after changing the order so that Alice
cannot measure the final state immediately. Alice announces her key after receiving the key encoded qubits from Bob as
in Protocol 1 and subsequently Bob announces the sequence of the message qubits sent by him. In QKA Alice does not
need to disclose her measurement outcome. This modified QD protocol is equivalent to our Protocol 1. This clearly shows
that all protocols of QD with n > m would lead to protocols of QKA. It is interesting because in [33] we have shown that
a large number of alternative combinations of quantum states and unitary operators can be used to implement QD. All
of them (if n > m) will be useful for QKA, too.
5.3 Efficiency analysis
A well-known measure of efficiency of secure quantum communication is known as qubit efficiency [38] which is given as
η =
c
q + b
, (3)
where c denotes the total number of transmitted classical bits (message bits), q denotes the total number of qubits used
and b is the number of classical bits exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communication used for checking
of eavesdropping is not counted). This measure was introduced by Cabello in 2000 and it has been frequently used since
then to compare protocols of secure direct communication. As we are not interested in communicating a message here, so
we may modify the meaning of c in η2 to make it suitable for comparison of protocols of QKA. In the modified notion c is
the length of the shared key generated by the protocol. Thus in case of our first protocol if we generate an n-bit shared
key then c = n. Further, in the entire protocol we have used 2n Bell states i.e., 4n qubits (of which n-Bell states were used
as decoy qubits). Thus q = 4n. Now Alice and Bob announces the coordinates of the message qubits and Alice announces
KA, each of these three steps require communication of n classical bits. Thus b = 3n. All other classical communications
incurred in the process are related to the checking of eavesdropping and classical bits exchanged for eavesdropping checking
are not counted in b. Thus b = 3n. This makes η = n4n+3n =
1
7 = 14.29%. In the similar manner if an n-bit shared key
is prepared through Protocol 2 then c = n and q = 3(2n + 3n) as each party creates n Bell states for key encryption
and 3n2 Bell states for eavesdropping checking. Further, each party uses 3n bits of classical information for the disclosure
of coordinates of the message qubits. Thus b = 3 × 3n = 9n and consequently η = n15n+9n =
1
24 = 4.17%. As YML
protocol is similar to the Protocol 2 with only difference in the strategy adopted for eavesdropping checking, for YML
protocol also we obtain η = 4.17%. Clearly, Protocol 1 is more efficient than Protocol 2 and YML protocol, but Protocol
1 is less efficient than its QSDC counterpart (PPGV protocol) whose qubit efficiency as per the unmodified definition is
η = n4n+2n =
1
6 = 16.67%
3. This is expected as with the increase on number of parties contributing to the key, q and b
required to generate the key of same size should also increase. This point can be further established by noting that η for
the 5-party protocol described above will be 170 = 1.43% as q = 4n× 5 = 20n, b = 2n× 5× 5 = 50n and c = n.
6 Conclusions
In the present work we have proposed two orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKA. The first one works for 2-party case
and the second one works for multi-party case. These are first set of orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKA as all
the existing protocols of QKA are based on conjugate coding. Thus the proposed protocols are fundamentally different
from all the existing protocols of QKA. Orthogonal-state-based protocols show that the use of conjugate coding or in
other words use of non-commutativity principle is not essentially required for unconditional security. Thus it requires
lesser quantum resources in a sense. To be precise, monogamy of entanglement is sufficient to protect these protocols
[27]. We have also shown that most of the existing protocols of QSDC and DSQC and all the protocols of QD can be
turned into protocols of QKA. Thus the present work leads to several new options for implementation of QKA. Further,
as the orthogonal-state-based protocols of QSDC and QKD are experimentally implemented in recent past, the protocols
proposed here seem to be experimentally realizable.
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3In PPGVAlice does not need to disclose her key KA. Everything else is the same and as a consequence b = 2n, q = 4n and c = n with c
being the number of bits in the message or key that is transmitted.
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